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Farmers’ Adaptation to Climate Change: A Framed Field Experiment 
Francisco Alpízar, Fredrik Carlsson, and Maria A. Naranjo 
Abstract 
The risk of losing income and productive means due to adverse weather can differ significantly 
among farmers sharing a productive landscape and is, of course, hard to estimate or even “guesstimate” 
empirically. Moreover, the costs associated with investments in adaptation to climate are likely to 
exhibit economies of scope. We explore the implications of these characteristics on Costa Rican coffee 
farmers’ decisions to adapt to climate change, using a framed field experiment. Despite having a 
baseline of high levels of risk aversion, we still found that farmers more frequently chose the safe 
options when the setting is characterized by unknown risk (that is, poor or unreliable risk information). 
Second, we found that farmers, to a large extent, coordinated their decisions to secure a lower 
adaptation cost and that communication among farmers strongly facilitated coordination. 
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Farmers’ Adaptation to Climate Change: A Framed Field Experiment 
Francisco Alpízar, Fredrik Carlsson, and Maria A. Naranjo∗ 
Introduction 
There is an extensive literature on the effects of climate change on agriculture (e.g., 
Adams 1989; Mendelsohn et al. 1994; Schlenker et al. 2005). Technological innovations, 
changing patterns of land use, and changes in ecosystem dynamics can either lessen or 
exacerbate the effect of climate change on agriculture (e.g., Antle 1995; Reilly 1995.) From a 
farmer’s perspective, climate change—whether it comes as slow changes in temperature or 
precipitation, changes in seasonal weather patterns, or more frequent extreme events (droughts or 
floods)—can be seen as a technology shock, whose potentially negative effects can be moderated 
by adapting1 the production function. Farmers can adapt tactically (changing input use and 
timing planting and harvesting) and/or strategically (e.g., selecting different crop varieties, 
diversifying crops, and/or purchasing crop insurance) to climate change (Bradshaw et al. 2004).  
Global climate analysis signals Central America as one of the most affected tropical 
regions in the world, in terms of higher temperatures (Aguilar et al. 2005; 2006), a clear “drying 
signal” (Rauscher et al. 2008), and increased variability (Giorgi 2006). Most important, global 
studies predict more intense rain and more widespread droughts (Aguilar et al. 2005; Sheffield 
2008; Magrin et al. 2007). In a recent report for Central America (Curry et al. 2008), a predicted 
0.6°C increase in sea surface temperature is associated with between 0 and 1 additional tropical 
cyclones per year and 10–26 percent increase in damage. 
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This article starts by constructing a standard baseline of farmers’ adaptation behavior and 
risk aversion under known risk, and then considers our two research questions. First, we tested 
whether farmers are ambiguity averse, and whether this explains adaptation behavior. Second, 
we explored if, and to what extent, farmers are able to coordinate their adaptation efforts in 
pursuit of economies of scope in adaptation costs. 
We used a framed field experiment (Harrison and List 2004), conducted with small-scale 
coffee farmers in Costa Rica, in which farmers were asked to act as if their decisions for the 
situations in the experiment reflected their actual behavior. The experiment also involved 
monetary payoffs. The baseline for the experiment was a standard risk experiment, such as Holt 
and Laury (2002), to which a realistic frame and treatments to explore ambiguity and 
cooperation were introduced. Previous risk experiments with farmers in developing countries 
include, for example, Binswanger (1980), Binswanger and Sillers (1983), and Wik et al. (2004). 
In our case, the values were chosen to give the farmers a familiar decision on whether to adapt to 
climate change, associated in this case with increased risk of extreme events and income losses. 
There are several reasons for using a framed field experiment instead of actual production 
data (e.g., Antle 1987; Antle 1989; Pope and Just 1991; Chavas and Holt 1996). First, with actual 
production data, it is difficult to disentangle adaptation due to changes in risk and risk perception 
from other reasons, such as changes in soil fertility or new market opportunities. Second, it is not 
clear whether farmers actually are aware of changes in climate over time, such as global 
warming, as opposed to the usual climatic variability. Third, climate change might bring about 
production conditions, particularly for extreme events, that have no historical parallel in this 
coffee-producing region. 
In addition to risk aversion, some authors have argued that ambiguity aversion is a key 
factor hindering the adoption of new technologies. In economics, the interest in unmeasurable 
uncertainty2 or ambiguity was spurred by the Ellsberg paradox (Ellsberg 1961). A number of 
experimental studies have shown that people are generally ambiguity averse (e.g., Fox and 
Tversky 1995; Moore and Eckel 2006; Slovic and Tversky 1974).3 By ambiguity aversion, we 
                                                 
2 Knight (1921) distinguished between measurable and unmeasurable uncertainty.  
3 For development of theories of ambiguity aversion, see, for example, Gajdos et al. (2008) and Klibanoff et al. 
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mean that there is a preference for known over unknown risks.4 In the case of technology 
adoption, the status quo is perceived to have a known level of uncertainty, given the agent’s 
experience with the old technology. On the other hand, the benefits of the new technology in 
good or bad scenarios are ambiguous, leading agents to reject it in favor of the old. In simple 
terms, the status quo is perceived as a safe, known bet. A recent paper that uses this setting is 
Engle-Warnick et al. (2007), who conducted a field experiment with coffee farmers in Peru. 
In the context of climate change and technology adoption, both the status quo (no 
adaptation) and the new state (adaptation) can be characterized by both risk and ambiguity. 
Climate change is a complex phenomenon, and the estimates of future increases in temperature 
or the likelihood of extreme events, for example, are very uncertain. The risks associated with 
not adapting to climate change could therefore be described as unknown or unmeasurable (IPCC 
2007). If farmers are ambiguity averse, they will more likely adapt to climate change when the 
risk of a disaster is unknown to them, compared to a similar situation with known risk. In our 
experiment, we explored the relevance of reliable risk information for adaptation decisions.5 
There is one other aspect that we investigated:  the capacity and willingness of farmers to 
coordinate in pursuit of lower adaptation costs. The cost of technology adoption is potentially a 
function of the behavior of others, either due to learning from others (Bandeira and Rasul 2006; 
Besley and Case 1993) or due to economies of scope. This opens the door for government 
intervention, as Dybvig and Spatt (1983) also suggested, aimed at insuring early adopters against 
the possibility that others do not follow, for example.  
In our experiment, we designed a situation where the cost of technology adoption is 
lower if everybody in the group (the farmers in our study) adopts. However, farmers face 
different risks and have different risk preferences. This means that the decision can be viewed as 
a coordination game, where there could be multiple equilibria (e.g., Ochs 1995; and Cooper et al. 
1999).  
                                                 
4 Klibanoff et al. (2005, 1852) defined ambiguity aversion as a preference for situations that exhibit less uncertainty 
about the underlying probabilities, “an aversion to mean preserving spreads in the induced distribution of expected 
utilities.” 
5 Viscusi and Chesson (1999) found that subjects in their experiment moved from ambiguity aversion when the risk 
of a loss is small (fear effect) to ambiguity-seeking behavior when the probabilities of a loss are large (hope effects). 
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Depending on a number of factors, including the physical and social distance between 
farmers and the quality of the institutions, farmers are more or less able to communicate with 
each other in pursuit of reduced costs, as described above. It is important, then, to differentiate 
between situations where coordination is possible with and without communication. Evidence 
from other experiments points consistently to the fact that communication leads to increased 
cooperation in public good settings even with heterogeneous subjects (Cardenas et al. 2004; 
Hackett et al., 1994; Ledyard 1995; Sally 1995). Moreover, studies also show that the link is not 
unequivocal because players might react negatively, if they identify noncooperative behavior in 
the course of group discussions.  
Some explanations for the effect of communication on group decisions include 
persuasion, verbal promises, creation of a group identity that favors cooperation, and improved 
understanding of the game. (e.g., Buchan et al. 2006; Bochet et al. 2006; Ostrom et al. 1994; 
Bochet and Putterman 2008). In our experiment, we investigated the extent to which farmers 
reduce their vulnerability to extreme events when there are economies of scope in the adaptation 
cost. We also conducted treatments with and without communication, when there were no 
strategic reasons for communication, in order to isolate any learning effect. 
The rest of the article is organized as follows. Section 1 provides background information 
on our sample and the study area where the experiment was conducted. Section 2 introduces the 
experiment design and procedure. Section 3 presents the results, and section 4 concludes the 
paper. 
1.  Description of Sample and Study Area 
We conducted our experiment with coffee producers in the Tarrazu region of Costa Rica. 
All coffee producers are organized in a cooperative, a common type of organization in Costa 
Rica, which provided our sampling frame. Still, individual farmers are completely free to make 
decisions for their land. This region is well known for its premium quality coffee, which results 
from the mix of high altitude, cold weather, and lots of sun. According to a census of coffee 
producers (ICAFE-INEC 2007), there are 672 coffee farmers in Tarrazu. Coffee plantations 
make up 76 percent of all the farms in the region. The average coffee farm size is 10.3 hectares, 
but 64 percent of the farms are smaller than 5 hectares. Almost all of the farmers own their land 
and, in 2006, only 10 percent had outstanding loans on their land. This gives a picture of a 
prosperous region that has an equal distribution of income. At the same time, however, farmers 
are highly vulnerable to changes in the profits from their land. Because the farms are small, 
profits generally are just enough to cover the household’s day-to-day expenses. The possibility of Environment for Development  Alpízar, Carlsson, and Naranjo 
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finding work outside the farm is limited, given that 84 percent of the farmers have only basic or 
no education. 
Changes in climate mean reduced coffee production, given the plants’ sensitivity to 
extreme temperatures (warm and cold) and humidity (both excessive moisture and drought). 
Wind and heavy rain can also bring severe losses if they occur during the flowering period and if 
they physically damage the plant (Tucker et al. 2010).  
In early 2008, tropical storm Alma hit the region with full force. The occurrence of such 
extreme weather events in this region is rare because it faces the Pacific Ocean. Based on 
historical records from 1949, only five extreme weather events have come near the Pacific coast 
of Costa Rica; Alma came closest and furthest south (IMN 2008). Only on two occasions have 
extreme climatic events originating in the Pacific Ocean seriously affected the Central American 
region, one in 2005 and Alma in 2008. The Tarrazu region was one of the most heavily affected, 
with approximately 12 percent of all coffee plants destroyed.  
In total, 211 farmers participated in our experiment. Table 1 gives descriptive statistics of 
our sample in the Tarrazu region, based on the 2007 coffee census, which is highly 
representative of the coffee farmers in this cooperative.  
Table 1. Background Statistics of the Sampled Farmers and Regional Census Data 
  Population Sample 
Average age in years  42  43.3 (15.6) 
Male head of household  68%  69% 
Education 
(none; basic; high school; university)  6%; 78%; 8%; 3%  7%; 74%; 14%; 4% 
Number of soil conservation 
practices at farm level  1.77 2.47  (1.42) 
Note:  Standard errors are in parentheses. 
Source: Authors’ estimations, based on coffee census (ICAFE 2007) 
2. Experimental  Design 
The experiment used a total of nine rounds to test our hypotheses and order effects. Since 
we revealed previously hidden information after round 4, we were only able to build in a test for 
order effects by altering the sequence of the last five rounds. Table 2 shows all nine rounds, and Environment for Development  Alpízar, Carlsson, and Naranjo 
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the first column reports the two sequences of treatments.6 Subjects always played in groups of 
three, clearly identified as farmer A, B, or C.  
Table 2. Complete Design and Built-in Test for Order Effects 
Round 
Risk (%) for farmers   Information 
about 
neighbors 
Gains as a result of 
coordination  Communication 
Farmer A  Farmer B  Farmer C 
1  1  5  10  No information  No  No 
2 5  10 1  No  information  No  No 
3  10  1  5  No information  No  No 
4 Unknown  Unknown  Unknown  n.a.  No  No 
5/7  1  1  1  Information  No  No 
6 1  5 10  Information  No  No 
7/5  1  5  10  Information  Yes, costs reduced 
50% 
No 
8/9  1  5  10  Information  Yes, costs reduced 
50% 
Yes 
9/8  1  5  10  Information  No  Yes 
 Rounds 1–3 built our baseline and are essentially a standard risk experiment. Risk levels 
(1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent) were chosen as realistic, based on expert advice, and then 
validated with pilot studies. In our context, where decisions are made annually, a 1 percent (10 
percent) risk level means that farmers might experience large losses due to extreme weather 
event once (10 times) every 100 years. Historical data show that the occurrence of extreme 
weather events in the Tarrazu region is, indeed, exceedingly uncommon and real risk is likely 
below 1 percent. The whole of the Mesoamerican region (Mexico to Panamá) faces one tropical 
cyclone (that makes land fall) per year, although pessimistic predictions double that rate (Curry 
et al. 2008). Hence, adding higher levels of risk would result in reduced realism.7 We explicitly 
told the farmers in the study to consider their group members as neighbors, but at this stage we 
asked for no interaction between them. We did not give them any information about the risk 
level of the other group members.  
                                                 
6 Henceforth, we use the first order when referring to the design of the experiment. Round 5 was introduced only to 
strengthen our tests for order effects. Notably, we found no significant order effects using a chi-square test (p-value 
= 0.828). 
7 In addition, our experimental results show most farmers adapt at a 10% risk level, so higher levels of risk would 
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Farmers were also told that their annual profits in the case of no extreme weather event 
were CRC 500,000 (approximately US$ 1,000),8 and in the case of an extreme weather event 
affecting their land, profits would be CRC 50,000 per year. The annual cost of investing in 
adaptation practices was CRC 200,000. We actually made a point of ensuring that all these 
numbers corresponded to the reality of coffee farming in the Tarrazu Region, using a 
representative hectare of land. It is important to stress that the Tarrazu Region uses highly-
productive, conventional production technology, and that the soil conservation practices required 
to adapt to climate change are not part of this technological package. Farmers normally would 
not spend their capital and labor on these practices, which include changing the intensification of 
production (e.g., adding shade trees) to accommodate environmental variations, changing 
planting locations to areas on the farm less exposed to wind or crevasses, and improving 
irrigation for droughts or water management for excessive rainfall, among others.  
2.1 Ambiguity  Aversion 
Round 4 was identical to the previous rounds, except that now we introduced uncertainty 
about the risk level. We told all group members that “you do not know your own risk or the risk 
of the others. The only thing you know is that your risk could be 1, 5, or 10 out of 100. We do 
not know your level of risk either.” We then proceeded to explain that, at the end, we would 
randomly determine which level of risk would qualify for payment. The main reason that we 
opted for this approach was to avoid a situation where subjects believed that the experiment was 
rigged by the researchers. Thus, it was clear to the participants that we did not have more 
information about the risk than they did.  
Because the payoff for a farmer facing the ambiguous situation in our experiment was 
determined by two known probabilities, one to select the risk level and the second to define the 
outcome, this is sometimes called a situation of weak ambiguity, in which expected risk is 5.3 
percent. We wanted to keep the probabilities as simple as possible and therefore the expected 
risk was not exactly the same as in the round with known risk equal to 5 percent. Table 3 
summarizes the design of the first four rounds and the last column shows the corresponding 
degree of relative risk aversion. This is the same measure reported by Holt and Laury (2002), and 
it assumes a constant relative risk-aversion utility function that is only a function of the payoff of 
the experiment. 
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Table 3. Baseline Risk and Ambiguity Treatment 
Risk levels*  Adapts        
(safe option) 
Does not adapt       
(risky option)  Degree of risk aversion if 




1% 300,000  50,000  500,000  3.4 
5% 300,000  50,000  500,000  2.25 
10%   300,000  50,000  500,000  1.75 
Unknown 
(between 1 and 
10%) 
300,000  50,000  500,000  If indifferent between 
unknown and risk of 5%, 
then ambiguity is neutral      
* Farmers faced all risk levels in one of the first three rounds. 
 2.2     Gains from Coordination and Communication 
Finally, rounds 6–9 were designed to test the effect of potential gains of coordinating 
adaptation efforts and the role of communication in increasing the likelihood of coordination. In 
all these four rounds, farmers A, B, and C faced risk levels of 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 
percent, respectively, and this information was known to all of them. We did this in order to 
reduce the informational differences between treatments with and without communication. In 
round 7, after stressing that they all had different risk levels and that extreme weather events 
could affect one farmer and not the others, we told each group of three farmers that “if the three 
of you decide to adapt, the cost of adaptation is 100,000 colones. If fewer than three of you 
decide to adapt, then the cost of adaptation is the same as before, that is 200,000 colones.” Note 
that at this stage we still did not allow any interaction between the players, so that rounds 6 and 7 
differed only in the potentially lower adaptation costs.  
Round 8 was identical to round 7, but now we finally permitted interaction between the 
three group members, which allowed us to test for the role of communication when there were 
gains to coordination. So, in rounds 6 and 9, there were no gains to coordination and, hence, no 
strategic reason for changing behavior in round 9 as a result of communication. Our two-by-two 
design let us isolate the use of communication in round 9 as a way of better understanding how 
communication was used as a tool for coordination. 
2.3 Experimental  Procedure 
The cooperative in Tarrazu organizes yearly meetings of all its members, who come from 
11 villages. We used those meetings to invite farmers to participate in our experiments (called 
workshops). The invitation was made jointly with the cooperative and included information Environment for Development  Alpízar, Carlsson, and Naranjo 
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about the date, time, and place of our workshops in each of the communities. We also mentioned 
that we hoped to learn from their experience with a changing climate, and that they would have 
the opportunity to participate in a set of activities where they could earn some money, depending 
on their decisions as farmers. The invitation had a detachable slip to be returned to us, with 
name, telephone number, and location filled in by each farmer. We followed up this invitation 
with phone calls to confirm their interest in participating. This process was not very different 
from the way the cooperative announces its own meetings. In total, we handed out 434 
invitations and received 397 expressions of interest (i.e., slips with contact details).  
A team of three highly-trained field researchers conducted the experiment. Farmers were 
escorted into the workshop room when they arrived and were randomly assigned as farmers A, 
B, or C in chairs arranged in groups of three. We made sure that people coming together did not 
form part of the same group. After a prudent lapse of time, we took away any remaining chairs, 
and latecomers were allowed to be observers at the back of the room.  
After welcoming the subjects and telling them about the purpose of the workshop, we 
explained that the experiment would last two hours and reassured them about the confidentially 
of their individual responses. At this time, we allowed people to leave if they chose, but very few 
took this option and only because they did not have the time. We also requested that there be no 
interaction between subjects until we specifically allowed them to communicate.  
We then explained the main aspects of the experiment. We introduced the notion of 
climate change and, most importantly, described the different possibilities available as adaptation 
to climate change strategies. At all times, we kept a neutral perspective concerning the need to 
invest in adaptation. We did mention that a change in precipitation and temperature, as well as in 
the frequency of extreme weather events, could negatively affect their profitability due to 
increased erosion, reduced soil fertility, and in the worst case severe losses, similar to those 
experienced from tropical storm Alma. This was obviously nothing new to the farmers. 
One of the main aspects at this stage was to explain risk to the farmers. We used visual 
aids depicting combinations of 100 red and white dots equivalent to 0 percent, 1 percent, 5 
percent, and 10 percent. These visual representations of risk were available the entire time. A 
rotating drum (tombola) with 100 red and white balls was also used, mainly to correlate the risk 
charts to the number of balls and eventually to our payment strategy. Throughout this 
presentation, we stressed that risk could differ between neighbors and that an extreme weather 
event could happen independently to all subjects. Several trial runs were conducted until there 
were no more questions.  Environment for Development  Alpízar, Carlsson, and Naranjo 
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The actual experiment started with an explanation of the setting. We told the subjects that 
we wanted to learn about their decisions as farmers in nine subsequent rounds and that at the end 
of the experiment we would pay them according to their decisions. We stressed that they should 
regard their group members as neighbors. At this stage, subjects were asked to open a booklet 
containing an example sheet, nine decision sheets (one for each round), and an exit survey. The 
pages were stapled together, such that the farmers could not browse forward in the booklet. We 
used the example sheet in appendix 1 to explain the basics of the nine rounds. At this stage, we 
introduced the payoffs and walked each farmer neutrally through the decision whether to invest 
or not. Again, we used the tombola to show them how their payment would be determined 
according to their risk.  
Finally, we explained the payment method, which is quite standard for this type of 
experiment. First, we told them that, at the end of the experiment, one of the nine rounds would 
be randomly selected for a real payment.9 Also, given our budget limitations, we explained that 
an exchange rate of 1:1,000 would be used, but asked them to focus on the per-hectare payoffs 
that corresponded with their reality as coffee producers. Our converted payment still exceeded 
one day’s salary on a coffee farm. Before starting the experiment, we conducted several example 
payments to show how we would pay, as well as to make it very clear that they were playing for 
real money.  
To reduce biases in data to be collected in several workshops, the field staff had a very 
detailed script to follow. A translated example of the script for round 1 is provided in appendix 2. 
The decision sheets were similar to the example in appendix 1, so the script served to guide 
subjects through the details of the round. We made small variations in this script as needed for 
the rest of the rounds.  
3.        Results 
A total of 211 observations were gathered in the 11 workshops held. The following 
results explore our two main research questions:  1) is there a difference in observed adaptation 
when farmers face unknown as opposed to known risk; and 2) to what extent do farmers 
coordinate their adaptation decision to reduce costs and what is the importance of 
                                                 
9 As noted before, if round 4 was selected for payment, we would make an additional random draw to select the risk 
level. Environment for Development  Alpízar, Carlsson, and Naranjo 
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communication? For the first question, we use individual observations, and for the second, we 
use group decisions. 
We began by building a standard baseline of farmers’ behavior when faced with varying 
levels of risk of having their crops destroyed by extreme weather. At this stage of the 
experiment, the farmers did not know the level of risk of the other participants. Each farmer 
made the decision to adapt or not for three risk levels. A number of farmers were inconsistent in 
the sense that they adapted at a low, but not at a high, level of risk. In total, 17 percent of the 
farmers were inconsistent.10 We removed the inconsistent farmers’ answers and were left with 
175 observations. Table 4 presents the number and share of farmers adapting and not adapting at 
the three different levels of risks.  
Table 4. Number of Farmers Not Adapting and Adapting under Various Levels of Risk 
Risk levels  Degree of relative risk 
aversion if indifferent  Does not adapt  Adapts 
1%  3.4  120 (69%)  55 (31%) 
5%  2.25  40 (23%)  135 (77%) 
10%  1.75  9 (5%)  166 (95%) 
Note:  P-value of chi-square test of difference in distribution between risk levels = 0.000. 
 As expected, the share of farmers adapting rises as the level of risk increases, and the 
differences in shares are significant, using a chi-square test. The degree of relative risk aversion, 
assuming a constant relative risk-aversion utility function (which is only a function of the payoff) 
is higher than 3.4 for 31 percent of the subjects, and the median degree of risk aversion is 
between 2.25 and 3.4. Consequently, the farmers are very likely to adapt to climate change, even 
at relatively low levels of risks. Still, given that our experiment took place a few weeks after the 
occurrence of an extreme weather event as dramatic as tropical storm Alma, we think it is 
noteworthy that 69 percent of all farmers did not adapt at a 1 percent risk, confessedly similar to 
the status quo. When the risk level increased to 10 percent, only 5 percent of the subjects did not 
adapt.  
                                                 
10 As expected, the share of inconsistent responses is somewhat higher than what is typically found in laboratory 
experiments with students. For example, in Holt and Laury (2002), the fraction of inconsistent choices ranged 5%–
13%, depending upon treatment. However, given the more complicated nature of the game, the more diversified 
subject pool, and the low education level of our sample, the observed share is acceptable. Environment for Development  Alpízar, Carlsson, and Naranjo 
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Finally, we estimated a logit model, where the dependent variable was equal to 1 if the 
farmer decides to adapt. We did this in order to explore the effect of socioeconomic 
characteristics, as reported in the exit survey completed by all subjects. The results are shown in 
the table in appendix 3. From the subject characteristics, we found that males and older farmers 
had a significantly higher probability of adapting, whereas education had no significant effect on 
behavior in the experiment. Subjects with big coffee farms are less likely to adapt, which could 
be a reflection of the fact that they have more resources to overcome adverse effects without 
compromising their livelihoods.  
3.1  Unknown Risk and Ambiguity Aversion 
We now turn to the first research question regarding the difference in adaptation behavior 
when farmers face unknown risk as opposed to risk. Since we only included one round with 
unknown risk—where the expected risk was 5.3 percent—what we can say about the farmers’ 
preferences toward ambiguity depends on their risk preferences. In table 5, we report adaptation 
behavior in the round with unknown risk for farmers with different risk preferences. 
Table 5. Number of Farmers Not Adapting and Adapting When Risk Is Unknown 
Behavior when risk is known  Behavior of set of farmers when 
risk is unknown 
Sets of farmers  No. of obs.  Does not adapt  Adapts 
Adapts when risk is 1%  55  9
a 46
b 





Adapts when risk is 10%, but not when 




Does not adapt even when risk is 10%  9  8
b 1
a 
a Inconsistent response  
b Ambiguity loving, neutral or averse  
c Ambiguity loving  
d Ambiguity averse  
e Ambiguity loving or neutral 
 Depending on the change in farmers’ behavior in the rounds where risk was known 
versus unknown, we can classify some of the farmers as either ambiguity neutral, averse, or 
loving. For some farmers, we do not have sufficient information. For example, the 55 farmers 
who adapted when the risk was 1 percent and known should also adapt when risk is unknown, 
but equal or larger than 1 percent, regardless whether they are ambiguity averse, neutral, or Environment for Development  Alpízar, Carlsson, and Naranjo 
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loving. As described in the table, some farmers were inconsistent. Our focus here is on the set of 
farmers definitely classified as either ambiguity averse or ambiguity loving. These are the ones 
that adapted when the risk is 10 percent, but not when the risk is 5 percent (31 out of 175 
farmers). Of these, 21 chose to adapt when they faced an ambiguous situation (with an expected 
risk of 5.33 percent), meaning that they are ambiguity averse. The remaining 10 farmers were 
either ambiguity neutral or loving. Using a chi-square test, the difference in the share of farmers 
adapting is highly significant (p-value = 0.000), suggesting that a large share of these farmers 
actually are ambiguity averse. Or, put differently, the fact that the risk is unknown induces more 
adaptation than the corresponding situation with known risk. 
3.2   The Role of Communication and Cost-Saving Coordination  
In the last four rounds of the experiment, subjects knew their own risk and the risk of the 
two other group members. The first difference between the rounds was whether subjects were 
allowed to communicate or not. The second difference was whether the subjects had an incentive 
to coordinate on adaptation or not. As explained in a previous section, farmers were told that if 
all group members decide to adapt, adaptation costs would be reduced by 50 percent. This is 
indeed a realistic situation because there are economies of scope in the provision of technical 
assistance and purchase of equipment and materials needed for the adoption of soil conservation 
practices.  
We now turn to the decision at the group level, where we removed groups with fewer 
than three farmers, resulting in a total of 68 groups. Table 6 summarizes the outcomes in the 
groups for the four treatments. 




Treatment 6  Treatment 7  Treatment 8  Treatment 9 









No gains with 
coordination and 
communication 
0  3 (4%)  0 (0%)  1 (1%)  3 (4%) 
1  11 (16%)  9 (13%)  6 (9%)  11 (16%) 
2  32 (47%)  26 (38%)  14 (21%)  28 (41%) 
3  22 (33%)  33 (49%)  47 (69%)  26 (39%) 
Note:  Treatments 6–9 were conducted in different orders to test for order effects, but we found no significant order 
effects. Aggregate results are reported in the table. 
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We can make two interesting comparisons. First, we tested whether the whole 
distribution of the number of subjects adapting in a group is different for two treatments, using a 
chi-square test. Second, we tested whether the share of groups actually achieving full 
coordination in adaptation (i.e., where all three players adapt) were different for the alternative 
treatments, using a proportion test. 
We first looked at treatments 6 and 7. In both cases, subjects were not allowed to 
communicate, but in round 7 the adaptation costs were reduced if all adapted. There was a 
significant increase (proportion test p-value = 0.055) in the share of groups where all adapted 
and, hence, got a reduced adaptation cost, but there is no significant difference in the overall 
distribution (chi square test p-value = 0.111). So, farmers were able to coordinate only to a 
limited extent if they could not communicate with each other, and the pattern of “failed” 
coordination efforts was not different in both cases. The question is what happens if we allow 
communication, as in treatment 8 (compared to 7).  
Communication in the pursuit of reduced adaptation costs produced a significant change 
in the distribution of responses (chi-square test p-value = 0.053) and, in 69 percent of the groups, 
all subjects adapted, thereby benefitting from coordination. This share was significantly different 
from the share in treatment 7 (proportion test p-value = 0.015).  
This result is further strengthened if we compare treatments 8 and 9. In round 8, 
communications were allowed and, if coordination was successful, would lead to reduced costs. 
In round 9, communication was also allowed, but was inconsequential in terms of costs. The 
increase in the number of groups where everybody adapted was high and significant when cost 
reductions were at stake, compared with no gains from coordination (proportion test p-value = 
0.001). The difference in distributions was also significant, using a chi-square test (p-value = 
0.004). In order to test the effect of communication alone, we compared treatments 6 and 9, 
which were not significantly different in terms of the distribution of responses (p-value = 0.896) 
or the share of groups coordinating (p-value = 0.473). Hence, communication had no effect on a 
farmer’s decisions in the absence of concrete gains from coordination. In our experimental 
setting, communication is thus not important in the sense of learning and understanding the 
experiment, but it is important for strategic coordination. 
4. Conclusion 
We conducted our experiment with coffee farmers in the Tarrazu region of Costa Rica, 
which was heavily affected by tropical storm Alma in early 2008. This type of extreme weather Environment for Development  Alpízar, Carlsson, and Naranjo 
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event is new to the region, and many farmers were taken by surprise. We purposely conducted 
our experiment in the region a few months after Alma. It is hard to explain to farmers that 
climate change can imply a change in the pattern of extreme weather events when farmers have a 
lot of prior experience with the expected types of events, and it was all too likely that they would 
disregard key features of the experiment. Given that farmers in Tarrazu were well aware of the 
dangers of an extreme weather event and at the same time had little or no prior expectations of 
the likelihood of future events, we believed this was a good setting to run risk-related 
experiments and, most importantly, test farmers’ behavior in response to key features of a 
changing climate and adaptation response. 
As expected, we observed high levels of risk aversion, but we also observed farmers 
making tradeoffs in the experiment. Furthermore, we found some evidence of ambiguity aversion 
for the group of farmers who did not adapt at low risk levels. The implications for policymaking 
with this ambiguity aversion are not straightforward. There is a lot of discussion in the literature, 
particularly with respect to environmental risks that are frequently associated with unmeasurable 
uncertainty (e.g., Treich 2009; Viscusi 1998; Viscusi and Hamilton 1999).  
In the case of climate change, it is actually realistic to assume that farmers, climate 
experts, and the government do not know the risk associated with changes in climate. Treich 
(2009) discussed two implications of acting on ambiguity aversion. On one hand, from a purely 
accounting view, putting concerns for ambiguity aversion on top of risk aversion at the 
government level might lead to too much protection and too much investment in avoiding 
unmeasurable risks. On the other hand, peoples’ preferences could favor governmental policies 
that pay attention to their aversion to ambiguous situations. Our results contribute to this 
discussion by identifying that ambiguity aversion seems to be an important motive behind 
decisions to adapt to climate change. We found that around 50 percent of our subjects, who 
chose not to adapt to a 5 percent risk when the risk was known, did adapt if the risk was 
ambiguous, but comparable to expected levels. Contrary to the discussion in the technology 
adoption literature, we found that ambiguity aversion is an important factor favoring the adoption 
of technology that would help farmers cope with climate change.  
What if the government actually knows the true distribution of probabilities of different 
levels of risk and farmers exhibit ambiguity aversion? This resembles a situation where people 
have biased risk perceptions. (See, e.g., Johansson-Stenman 2008 for a discussion about 
perceived and objective risk.) From a social efficiency perspective, this might lead, in retrospect, 
to too much adaptation. In this situation, it could be optimal for the government to provide 
(costly) information to reduce the degree of ambiguity of individuals, insurance programs against Environment for Development  Alpízar, Carlsson, and Naranjo 
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worse-case scenarios, and improved safety networks, just to mention a few strategies for dealing 
with an extremely negative scenario. 
Finally, we also explored the role of communication and monetary incentives (in the form 
of cost-reducing economies of scope, arising from full coordination) on the decision to adapt or 
not to adapt to climate change. Monetary incentives for coordination significantly increased the 
degree of adaptation. However, when communication was allowed, farmers were able to 
coordinate more frequently in pursuit of the reduced adaptation costs. Notably, if no financial 
motives are allowed, communication is irrelevant to a farmer’s private decision. Note, too, that 
our subjects were experienced farmers who make similar decisions every day and, hence, are less 
likely to be influenced by peers when it comes to how they run their own land.  
These results provide a strong mandate to producer and local organizations, which can 
play a key facilitating role in sorting out the most promising technologies, the cheapest providers 
of those technologies, and the securement of more readily available access to technical 
assistance. According to our results, farmers will converge on these organizations in pursuit of 
reliable risk estimates and economies of scope in adaptation costs.   Environment for Development  Alpízar, Carlsson, and Naranjo 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1.     Example Sheet for Farmer A, Used to Explain the Experiment   
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Appendix 2.     Translated Script for Round 1  
(Square brackets are not read aloud.) 
In this case, the question is whether you choose to invest or not in adaptation, given the level of 
risk shown on your sheet. As a visual aid, you can see in this slide all the possible risk levels you 
can face. [Show slide with three risk levels] 
If you choose to invest in adaptation, your profit is X colones, independent of the level of 
risk.  
If you choose not to invest in adaptation, your profit will depend on the risk of a natural 
disaster, as described on your sheet. 
You do not know the level of risk of the other farmers. This risk could be higher or lower 
than yours. The other farmers do not know your risk either. Also, please remember that what 
happens to you will not necessarily happen to the others. In practice, this means that each one of 
you separately will draw a ball from the tombola to determine what happens to your farm. As 
mentioned before, the number of red balls in the tombola depends on your own risk. In some 
cases, there will be 5 red balls, others might have just 1, and some will have 10 red balls in the 
tombola. Please check your level of risk carefully. Will you choose to adapt or not, given that 
level of risk? 
Do not forget that you do not know the risk of the other farmers, and that each case is a 
new situation that has no relation to the previous situation. Please do not talk to each other. Do 
you have any questions? [Wait; answer questions.] Please mark your decision in the 
corresponding box. 
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Appendix 3.     Results 
Logit Results Using the 5% Risk Level as Baseline  
    Description (mean)  Marginal effect  P-value 
Treatment characteristics       
Low risk (1%)  = 1 if low risk (0.33)  -0.427  0.000 
High risk (10%)  = 1 if low risk (0.33)  0.271  0.000 
Subject characteristics       
Male  = 1 if subject is male (0.71)  0.125  0.077 
Age  Age in years (43.33)  0.003  0.052 
Big coffee farm  = 1 if number of hectares > 5 (0.27)  -0.146  0.037 
Previous investment in soil 
conservation 
Number of soil conservation 
measures implemented (2.46) 
0.029 0.163 
Losses due to tropical storm Alma  = 0 if no losses; 2 if losses larger than 
CRC 250,000 per hectare; 1 
otherwise (1.81) 
-0.009 0.817 
Number of subjects; number of 
observations 
 175;  525   
Pseudo-R2   0.252   
Note:  Standard errors are corrected for clustering. Dependent variable is equal to 1 if farmer adapts. 
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